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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990: AN
ANALYSIS BASED ON THE FRENCH DROIT MORAL
Jill R. Applebaum*
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of moral rights (le droit moral), protects the artist's'
spirit as embodied in his or her work.' It accomplishes this by arming
authors with extraordinary rights.3 In France, where the moral rights
doctrine has been most highly developed,' moral rights confer upon the
author: (1) the right to decide whether to communicate or divulge work
to the public; (2) the right to withdraw or amend a published work; (3)
the right to receive credit or attribution for authorship; and, (4) most
importantly, the right to preserve the integrity of his or her work.,
* J.D. candidate 1993, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. In this Comment the term "artist" refers to all authors or creators.
2. F. Pollaud-Dulian, Moral Rights in France. Through Recent Case Law, 145
R.I.D.A. 126 (July 1990); see INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PaCTICE 90-91
(Bender 1988) [hereinafter INT'L COPYRIGHT] (stating that French law "views a work
of the mind as bearing the imprint of its author's personality"); see also Peter H.
Karlen, Joint Ownership of Moral Rights, 38 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 242, 242
(1990) (noting that artists and other creative persons consider moral rights to be as
important as copyrights).
3. See infra notes 23-97 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of the
moral right).
4. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 128 (stating that French moral rights law
is "one of the most highly developed and affords authors particularly effective protec-
tion"); INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 90-91 (explaining that French law elevates
the concept of moral rights). See also Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral
Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y, U.S.A. 1, 2 (1980) (noting that France is the "vanguard of
protection" of artist's rights). Many European and some Latin American countries also
embrace the doctrine of moral rights. John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard
Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025 (1976).
5. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 3-4 (delineating the four categories of moral
rights). Some scholars, however, believe there are only three categories of moral rights:
divulgation, paternity, and integrity. Merryman, supra note 4, at 1028. According to
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French law perceives the moral right as a natural and personal right
rather than as a purely legal right.' This perception derives from the
French belief that artists pour a part of their soul into their work,7
creating a personal link between themselves and their creations., Cer-
tain characteristics stem from the nature of the right. French law pro-
vides that moral rights are perpetual, inalienable, and non-seizable.9
Until last year, the United States had no laws to compare to French
moral rights law.10 With the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 (VARA), 1 however, the United States has finally adopted
a framework for providing moral rights protection to artists.12 The
VARA, which amends the United States copyright statute, provides
much more limited protection than French law. It covers visual works
of fine art, rather than all works of the mind, and accords to artists
these scholars, the right to disavow exists merely as a part of the more general moral
right, rather than as an independent right. Id.
6. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 11 (discussing the natural rights origins of au-
thors' rights).
7. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 126 (explaining "[i]t is [the author's] sensi-
bility. . . . his soul and thus himself that he expresses in the work"); see also INT'L
COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 90-91 (observing a kinship between the moral right and
the personality right).
8. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 11 (explaining that authors bond with their works
since they inject a part of their being or personality into their works).
9. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 132.
10. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 27 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Gurfein, J., concurring) (pronouncing that the Lanham Act is not a substitute for the
droit moral enjoyed by European authors); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d
Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring) (stating that "[tihe 'moral right' doctrine, as applied
in some countries, includes very extensive rights which courts in some American juris-
dictions are not yet prepared to acknowledge"); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522,
526 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948) (holding that Esquire Magazine
had the right to reproduce the plaintiff's artwork without his name because "[tihe con-
ception of 'moral rights' of authors so fully developed in the civil law countries has not
yet received acceptance in the law of the United States"); Geisel v. Poynter Products,
295 F. Supp. 331, 339-40 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding that the doctrine of moral
rights, which might otherwise provide the plaintiff cartoonist with the right to prevent
the defendant magazine publisher from altering his drawings, "is not part of the law in
the United States"); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819
(Sup. Ct. 1949) (holding that plaintiff artist could not prevent the church in which he
had created a fresco from painting over that fresco because he relinquished all rights in
it by unconditionally selling it to the church, and moreover, moral rights did not exist
under New York or United States law); see also DaSilva, supra note 4, at 5-6 (stating
that United States law rejects the moral rights doctrine); Merryman, supra note 4, at
1035-36 (observing that the right of integrity does not exist under United States law).
11. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5130 (codi-
fied as amended in various sections of 17 U.S.C. (West Supp. 1992)).
12. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Act of 1990, 14
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 478 (1990).
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only the rights of attribution and integrity. 3 The VARA differs from
French law in other essential respects. For example, it limits moral
rights protection to the life of the author and permits authors to alien-
ate their moral rights.'
This divergence in treatment of artistic protection reflects fundamen-
tal differences between French and American legal attitudes.'8 Since
the French Revolution,' 6 the French have held artists' rights in the
highest esteem;' 7 moral rights, central to their notion of copyright, ad-
vance well beyond the scope of American copyright law.18 On the con-
trary, the United States, until recently, has refused to recognize artists
as a distinct class, in need of special protection. 9 Whereas French law
differentiates art from other forms of property in order to protect intel-
lectual and moral interests, 0 United States copyright law has tradition-
ally treated art like any other object of property - its primary goal
has been to protect only economic interests.
2'
The United States' fledgling moral rights legislation has emerged out
of an experience quite distinct from its French counterpart. While his-
tory and attitudes differ, however, moral rights legislation can work
13. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 106A (West Supp. 1992); Edward J. Damich, The Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for
Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 945, 946-47 (1990).
14. Damich, supra note 13, at 947.
15. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 53.
16. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 128. The doctrine of moral rights grew out of
the philosophy of individualism, as embodied in the French Revolution. Laura L. Van
Velzen, Note, Injecting a Dose of Duty into the Doctrine of Droit Moral, 74 IowA L.
REV. 629, 632-33 (1989). By the late eighteenth century, authors rejected the notion
that their artistic rights existed as a sovereign privilege, and came to believe that they
were born with certain basic rights, conferred by natural law as an act of creation. Id.
17. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 4 (citing leading French commentator,
Henri Desbois, as stating that "[i]n the view of French jurists, moral rights are not
trifling interests which merely are appended to the law of copyright. On the contrary,
they derive from ... natural law principles [and] indeed are independent from and
superior to any pecuniary interest in a work of art").
18. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 128 (commenting that the elevated role of
droit moral in French society derives in part from the culture's traditional respect for
the arts and sciences); DaSilva, supra note 4, at 7 (translating Pierre Recht as stating
that "when droit moral fanatics discuss moral rights, they take the attitude of a reli-
gious zealot talking of sacred things").
19. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 54.
20. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 128 (distinguishing the French system
from those where economic interests dominate); see also DaSilva, supra note 4, at 12
(emphasizing the romantic nature of droit moral and stating how the French believe
that the author, in creating a work of art, makes a gift to the world which in return
bestows upon the author the right to respect for his or her genius).
21. Merryman, supra note 4, at 1037; see also DaSilva, supra note 4, at 54 (noting
that American law tends to view art "more as an object of commerce than as a product
of the spirit").
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within the United States legal system.22 This Comment analyzes the
French droit moral and compares it to the American moral rights ex-
perience, as codified in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. Part I
provides an understanding of the French moral rights doctrine as set
forth in the 1957 Law. Part II outlines the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990. Part III analyzes and compares the moral rights doctrines as ar-
ticulated in both French and United States law. Part IV offers recom-
mendations for modification of the VARA, based upon the French ex-
perience in order to facilitate the successful integration of the moral
rights doctrine into United States jurisprudence.
I. DROIT MORAL
A. BACKGROUND
In France, copyright law (droit d'auteur) is composed of two ele-
ments, the economic right (droit patrimoniaux) and the moral right (le
droit moral).23 Both rights are codified in a single statute, the Law of
11 March 1957 (the 1957 Law)," but operate independently of each
other.25
22. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 1042-49 (advocating modification of United
States law to protect moral rights, but recognizing the difficulty of adopting a French
moral rights framework since such a system is "in some basic sense alien to American
ideals and experience"); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Liter-
ary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REv. 991, 991-96
(1990) [hereinafter Tale of Two Copyrights] (explaining that the differences in French
and American copyright law are not as extensive as generally portrayed and thus
should not preclude harmonization). But see DaSilva, supra note 4, at 53-56 (contend-
ing that it may be impossible to successfully transport moral rights to the United
States).
23. See INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 10 (outlining the French dualist theory
of copyright).
24. Loi du Mars 1957 Sur La Popiete Litteraire Artistique [Law No. 57-298 on
Literary and Artistic Property], (1957) J.O., translated in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT
LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1990) [hereinafter 1957 Law]. The 1957 Law
has been amended by the Law of July 3, 1985. The 1985 amendments primarily ad-
dress moral rights with regard to computer software and establish rules for audiovisual
works. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 130. The amendments do not fundamentally
alter the substance or philosophy of the 1957 Laws. Id.
25. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 11.
[Tihe conveyance of economic right will leave the entitlement of the author to
moral right altogether unaffected. Whoever then exploits a work commercially,
therefore, may not modify it without the author's consent. Similarly, the transfer
of moral right upon the death of an author takes place according to rules differ-
ent from those applicable to transfers of economic right.
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The economic right, akin to the American concept of copyright,26 is
a property right which consists of a temporary monopoly 27 to exploit
and draw profits from protected works.2 The right is typically used
when conveying an author's work and is by nature transferrable.29
Whereas the moral right protects the author's rights, the economic
right protects the product of the creative act - the material, corporeal
object.3"
The moral right, akin to a right of personality,"1 predominates over
the economic right.32 It is designed to protect the author's right to
maintain respect for his or her name and work.33 Since the primary
justification for the right is the idea that art is an extension of the
artist's personality, and that to mistreat the work is to harm the artist,
the right attaches to the artist who creates the work, and not to the
work itself.34
B. SUBJECT MATTER
Authors attain moral rights by creating a work 30 regardless of the
form, merit, or purpose of the work." The work, however, must re-
26. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 3 (comparing artists' rights in France and the
United States).
27. 1957 Law, supra note 24, at tit. II. The economic right endures for a term of
the author's life plus fifty years. Ir'TL COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 102.
28. See 1957 Law, supra note 24, at tit. II (discussing the general exploitation
rights of the author); INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the economic
right of exploitation).
29. See INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2 at 1I (referring to Articles 1, 19, and 21
of the 1957 Law).
30. See Katherine Marik, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: The United
States Recognizes Artists and Their Rights, 8 Ewr'. & SPORTS LAWYER 7, 10 (1991)
(differentiating between property rights in art; -[a]rt may be considered either chattel
or a unique object, rather than a commodity") (footnote omitted).
31. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 10. While the moral right and the personal-
ity right have much in common, the focus of the moral right is on the author, relative
to an author's work of the mind. Id. at 91. By contrast, the focus of the personality
right is on any sort of reputational harm (i.e., prejudice to honor); the person need not
be an author. Id.
32. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 128 (discussing the fundamental role of
the French moral right).
33. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 10.
34. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 12. See generalyir 1957 Law, supra note 24, at tit. I
(discussing the moral right of the author).
35. 1957 Law, supra note 24, at art. 2; see INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at I I-
12 (explaining that authors need not go through any formalities, such as disclosure or
registration, to receive moral rights protection).
36. See 1957 Law, supra note 24, at art. 2 (stating that "Itjhe provisions of this
law shall protect the right of authors of all intellectual works, regardless of their kind,
form of expression, merit or purpose").
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present an "intellectual work" or a "work of the mind. ' 37 Although the
1957 Law does not explicitly define "work of the mind," it offers exam-
ples of the types of creations it protects: books, pamphlets, lectures,
court pleadings, choreographic works, musical compositions, cinemato-
graphic works, drawings, paintings, architecture, sculpture, maps, and
computer software.38 The law thus offers an extremely broad range of
protection.
While it seems as if the 1957 Law extends protection to most forms
of intellectual work, the subject matter of protection does have limita-
tions. One French court has held that it "only protects specific, individ-
ualized, and perfectly identifiable creations, not a genre or a family of
forms. . . -39 Although the law protects all intellectual works, regard-
less of kind, courts have been reluctant to extend moral rights protec-
tion to works that address the senses of smell and taste.4 Even with
these limitations, the French moral rights doctrine touches upon a wide
range of intellectual creations.
C. FEATURES
By its nature, the moral right is perpetual,41 inalienable,42 non-seiza-
37. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 11-13.
38. 1957 Law, supra note 24, at art. 3; see INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 11-
12 (noting that the work does not even have to be "fixed," so that moral rights might
extend to, for instance, dance performances or unrecorded law lectures).
39. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 13 (citing Judgment of May 26, 1989,
Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 10e ch., D.S. Jur. 210, obs. Colombet); see also id. at 13 n.16.1
(citing Judgment of March 13, 1985 (Schlumpf v. Dufay), Cass. com., Paris, D.S. Jur.
542, note Edelman (Fr.) (holding that a family's collection of vintage cars did not
constitute a work of the mind "in which an author's moral rights would arise")).
40. See INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 14 (citing Judgment of July 10, 1974,
Trib. gr. inst., Paris, D.S. somm. 40 (holding that culinary recipes are excluded from
copyright protection)); see also id. (citing Judgment of July 3, 1975 (Apaco v. Parfums
Ulric de Varens), Paris, R.I.D.A. 1977, No. 91, at 108 (holding that perfume formulas
are not works of the mind despite the fact that they are entitled to copyright
protection)).
41. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 6, 19 and 20. Moral rights endure even after
economic rights expire. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 216, 232. As long as the work
remains, "it is the function of the right to ensure that the author and his work are
protected." Id. at 232.
After death, moral rights transfer to the author's descendants, spouse, other heirs, or
general legatees. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 102. Ideally, the person or persons
left to guard the author's work will act on behalf of the wishes of the author, rather
than in his or her own interest. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 232. However,
in the case of manifest abuse of the exercise or non-exercise of the right to dis-
close or rights to exploit a work by the deceased author's representatives referred
to in the preceding article, the tribunal civil may order any appropriate
measure ....
The matter may be referred to the tribunal particularly by the Minister in
charge of Arts and Letters.
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ble,43 and universal.4 Thus, foreign authors may invoke the right in
France, even if their home nations do not have moral rights laws of
their own.45 The 1957 Law has several other significant characteristics.
It provides that authors of intellectual works shall have moral rights
against all persons. The only limits on protection are that the author
must be a natural person and must be the creator of the work.4 At
times, such seemingly benign requirements present practical difficulties.
For instance, organizations and private corporations, such as artist
guilds, newspapers, or magazines may not claim moral rights if no one
author is responsible for the entity's creation.' 8 Similarly, where artists
such as film makers have collaborated on a work, as occurs with
greater frequency in modern society, special rules must apply to pre-
1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 20.
In 1946, the French government created the National Literary Fund. Raymond Sar-
raute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law,
16 Am. J. Comp. L. 465, 484 (1968). The fund, which was placed under the Minister
of Arts and Letters control, is empowered to protect the integrity of literary works,
which "after the author's death, have fallen into the public domain." Id. In addition,
the 1957 Law creates a special provision for the disclosure of posthumous works. Pol-
laud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 216-32.
42. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 6. Under French law, moral rights cannot be
assigned by contract or waived. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 132. Courts and schol-
ars have repeatedly emphasized that "inalienability" is a fundamental component of
the moral right; see DaSilva, supra note 4, at 16 (citing Desbois, who equated alienat-
ing one's moral right with "moral suicide"). Moreover, courts will generally refuse to
enforce contracts containing a waiver clause as a condition of employment or sale. Id.
While French courts continue to reaffirm the notion that authors cannot explicitly
waive their moral rights, they have shown that they are not hostile to the idea of im-
plicit waiver. See infra note 261 (discussing the French courts' treatment of waiver).
For example, if an author of a book authorizes a third party to adapt his work into a
play, courts may find that he implicitly waived his integrity rights (such as a change in
medium). Id.
43. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 132; INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, at 10-
11.
44. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 132. Since the French perceive the moral right
as a natural right, it is logical that the right apply to all peoples, independent of their
nationality. Id.
45. See id. at 156 (explaining that while courts have traditionally protected the
rights of foreign authors, the Fourth Chamber of the Paris Court recently denied
American authors the right to invoke their moral rights in France in Rowe v. Walt
Disney and Turner v. Huston and Maddow); Michael Landau, Colourization. Copy-
right and Moral Rights: A U.S. Perspective. 5 INTELL. PROP. J. 215, 246-252 (1990)
(addressing the Turner v. Huston and Maddow litigation).
46. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 1.
47. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 12.
48. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 12-13; see 1957 Law, supra note 24, at art. 19 (creat-
ing a special exception to deal with the problems created by collective works).
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vent one author from claiming his or her right to the exclusion of the
others.4 9
D. RIGHTS PROTECTED
The moral right is a composite right.50 Scholars have traditionally
classified the moral right into four components: the right to divulge, the
right to withdraw, the right to paternity, and the right to integrity"
1. Divulgation
Authors have the right to control the disclosure of their work.
2 If
the author believes his or her work is incomplete or a failure, he or she
cannot be forced to bring it to the attention of the public. 3 Where an
author has not entered into a contractual agreement to disclose a work,
his or her right to control divulgation is absolute. 54 Although no statute
defines divulgation, French courts commonly understand it as the act of
communicating work to others.55 Thus, courts have inferred an intent
to divulge from the sale or publication of a work. 0
Disputes regarding divulgation often arise when third parties com-
mission authors to create works. 51 In the leading case on the subject,
Whistler v. Eden,58 the Paris Cour de cassation held that where artists
retain their work in good faith (i.e., because they are dissatisfied with
their work), they will not be compelled to divulge it to the party that
commissioned it, although they may be responsible for damages for
49. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 12-13; see 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 10 (setting
forth the Law's treatment of collaborative works).
50. Merryman, supra note 4, at 1027.
51. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 3-4.
52. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 19. Article 19 provides, "[t]he author alone shall
have the right to divulge his work. He shall determine the method of disclosure and
shall fix the condition thereof...." Id.
53. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 162. Even if the author is destitute, and divul-
gation of the work would cover the author's debts, creditors cannot force the author to
sell. Id. "So long as a work of art has not been completely created - of which the
artist alone can be the judge - it remains a mere expression of its creator's personal-
ity, and has no existence beyond that which he tentatively intends to give it." Sarraute,
supra note 40, at 467.
54. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 94.
55. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 93.
56. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 93.
57. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 164.
58. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 92 (citing Judgment of Dec. 2, 1897
(Whistler v. Eden), Cours d'appel, Paris, D.P.II 1898, at 2465, Judgment of March 14,
1900, Cass. civ. Ire note Planiol (Fr.).
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breach of contract. 59 Similarly, third parties may neither prohibit art-
ists from completing works that have already been commissioned, 60 nor
reconstruct works that artists themselves have destroyed.6'
2. The Right to Withdraw
Even after authors have disclosed their work, they retain the right to
withdraw it from the public in order to prohibit its distribution or to
modify it.62 Some specialists do not recognize this right as a separate
moral right, but see it instead as a part of the more general moral
rights doctrine.6 3 The majority of scholars agree that authors may in-
59. DaSilva supra note 4, at 18. In Whistler v. Eden, the Cour de cassation, af-
firming the Cours d'appel, held that, in keeping with Article 19 of the 1957 Law, Lord
Eden could not compel Whistler to deliver the portrait that he had painted for Lord
Eden when Whistler did not wish to divulge it. IT'L COPYRIGHT supra note 2, at 92-
93. Lord Eden had commissioned James McNeill Whistler to paint a portrait of his
wife, and promised payment of between 100 and 150 guineas. Merryman, supra note 4,
at 1025 (citing Whistler). Whistler completed the portrait, and proceeded to exhibit it
at the Salon du Champs de Mars, but then refused to deliver the work to Lord Eden.
Id. He had received payment of 100 guineas. Id. Whistler claimed that although he
had shown the work at a salon, he was dissatisfied with his rendering of Lady Eden's
face. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 18 (citing Whistler). While the Cour de cassation up-
held Whistler's right of divulgation, it held that Whistler refrain from further exhibi-
tion of the painting, return his fee, and compensate Lord Eden for breach of contract.
Merryman, supra note 4, at 1024 & n.4 (citing Whistler).
60. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 166, 274 n.72 (citing Judgment of Jan. 8,
1980 (Dubuffet v. R~gie Nationales des Usines Renault), Cass. civ. Ire, R.I.D.A. April
1980, at 154, A. Francon obs./ Judgment of March 16, 1983, Cass. civ. Ire, R.I.D.A.
July 1983, at 80). There, the Cour de cassation held that the Renault Motor Com-
pany, which had commissioned Dubuffet to create a monumental sculpture, could not
withdraw the commission after Dubuffet had already commenced construction. Id. at
166-68. "[T]he author... has a moral right in that structure insofar as it derives its
originality from the model and realizes its author's conception." Id. at 166.
61. See INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 93 n.237.2 (citing Judgment of March
6, 1931 (Camoin v. Carco), Cours d'appel, Paris, D.P.II 88). In Camoin, the Paris
Cours d'appel ruled that the plaintiff painter's rights had been violated when a third
party retrieved the torn pieces of the painter's work from the trash, put them back
together, and displayed them. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 162. See also l,'T,'L
COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 94 (affirming that "it has been repeatedly decided that
the publication of a work destroyed by the author and reconstructed by another person
constitutes a violation of the moral right").
62. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 32. "Notwithstanding the transfer of the ex-
ploitation rights, the author, even after the publication of his work, shall enjoy... the
right to correct or retake." Id. See Sarraute, supra note 41, at 476-77 (stating that an
author may prohibit reproduction and distribution of his or her work, even after dis-
closure); see also Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 180 (citing Desbois, who commented
that the act of withdrawal is merely a stage in the author's reaction to his own work:
"he regrets his decision to publish the work and then withdraws the work").
63. Merryman, supra note 4, at 1028.
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yoke this right without justification,6 4 and that the right applies to writ-
ten rather than visual artworks.6 5
In theory, the right to withdraw empowers authors with extraordi-
nary rights. 6 It authorizes writers, for example, to demand removal of
their books from publication even after a publisher has printed and dis-
tributed them in the market.6" In practice, however, the right to with-
draw provides authors with little of value.68 Since the 1957 Law re-
quires that authors who wish to invoke the right to withdraw indemnify
their transferees prior to asserting the right,69 authors cannot take ad-
vantage of the right if they cannot pay for it.70 The limitations on the
use of this component of the droit moral render it virtually useless.1
3. Paternity
At all times after creation of a work, authors retain the right to re-
ceive both respect for their name and credit for their work.7 2 Since
artists project their own personality into their work, the doctrine of
droit moral grants them the right to claim authorship of their cre-
ations.73 Specifically, creators enjoy three rights: (1) the right to be
recognized as the authors of their work or, in the alternative, to publish
anonymously or under a pseudonym; (2) the right to prevent their work
64. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 23.
65. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 182 (explaining that the language of Article
32 refers to "the transferee of the exploitation rights and not the transferee of the
work's physical medium").
66. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 24.
67. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 24 (positing that the right, if enforced, could
impose tremendous problems).
68. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 24 (explaining that the 1957 Law limits the
right's potential harm by imposing statutory restraints); see also Sarraute, supra note
41, at 477 (stating that "[t]he right of withdrawal is clearly of so little efficacy that it
has never. . . been exercised"); Marshall A. Leaffer, Of Moral Rights and Resale
Royalties: The Kennedy Bill, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 234, 241 (1989) (agree-
ing that the right to withdraw holds little practical application, even in France).
69. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 32. The author cannot "exercise this right except
on the condition that he indemnify the transferee beforehand for the loss that the cor-
rection or retraction may cause him." Id. The law also provides, "if the author does
[eventually] have his work published. . . , he shall be required to offer his exploitation
rights in the first instance to the transferee." Id.
70. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 24.
71. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 26. In fact, since the 1957 Law was promulgated,
there has been little to no litigation concerning the exercise of this right. Sarraute,
supra note 40, at 477.
72. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 6. "The author shall enjoy the right to respect
for his name, his authorship, and his work." Id. (emphasis added). Note, the first part
of this clause embodies the right of integrity. See infra notes at 80-97 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the integrity right).
73. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 26.
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from being attributed to someone else; and (3) the right to prevent
their name from being used on works they did not actually create. 4
Courts have applied the paternity right broadly. For example, repro-
ducing a work without the author's name has been held to violate this
right.7  Similarly, courts have ruled that an author's name must appear
on all publicity of his or her work,7 6 and in the case of joint works, all
collaborators have the right to be identified as authors of their work.77
In the leading case of Guille v. Colmant,7 1 the Paris Cours d'appel
ruled that third parties cannot bind authors to contracts which require
them to renounce their authorship,79 thus upholding and confirming the
inalienable nature of the paternity right.
4. Integrity
After artists have completed and disclosed their work, they retain the
right to demand respect for their reputation." Accordingly, the right of
integrity provides authors with all intellectual rights in a work, regard-
less of whether they physically own that work.8 Thus, third parties
may not transform or alter a work without the author's authorization. 2
74. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 26 (outlining the components of the paternity
right); see also INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 95 (describing the French law's
treatment of the paternity right).
75. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 27 & n.181 (citing Judgment of July 8, 1954, Trib.
civ. Confolens).
76. See DaSilva, supra, note 4, at 27 & n.178 (citing Judgment of Feb. 20, 1922,
Trib. civ. Seine, Gaz. Pal. 2282); see also INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 95 (stat-
ing that third parties and publishers may not publicize an author's work without credit-
ing the author for that work).
77. Sarraute, supra note 41, at 478 & n.28 (citing D. Repertoire de Jurisprudence
V Prop.Lit.et Art. No. 194, in which the Paris Cours d'appel held that "the collabora-
tor whose name has been omitted without his knowledge from the title of a work may
obtain recognition of his authorship and his rights through the courts").
78. Sarraute, supra note 41, at 478 & n.36 (citing Cours d'appel, Paris (Guille v.
Colmant), Gaz. Pal. 1967.1.17).
79. Sarraute, supra note 41, at 478 & n. 36. In Guille, an artist and dealer entered
into a contract by which the artist agreed to sign all the canvasses reserved to the
dealer with a pseudonym, and to refrain from signing the rest of his paintings. Id. The
Paris Cours d'appel held that his contract harmed the artist's reputation and violated
the artist's rights to have his authorship recognized. Id. at 478-79.
80. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 6. "The author shall enjoy the right to respect
for his name .... and his work. This right shall be attached to his person." Id.
81. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 208.
82. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 6. A publisher may not modify an author's text.
INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 97-8 (citing Judgment of Jan. 7, 1982, Cours
d'appel, Paris, R.I.D.A., No. 114, at 177, D.S. Jur., inf. rap. 97, obs. Columbet). Simi-
larly, a publisher may not include an unauthorized but favorable preface in his or her
work. Id. See also Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 192 (citing Judgment of Nov. 25,
1987, Trib. gr. inst. Paris, J.C.P. II, No. 21602, note Edelman). A film distributor may
not add a musical soundtrack to a silent film. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 98
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In addition, authors need not show that such modifications have
harmed their reputation.8 3 This right stems from the notion that the
work represents an expression of the author's personality, and that any
alteration would injure the reputation of the artist.84 Scholars consider
the right of integrity to be the most essential moral right.85 It comple-
ments the right of divulgation by granting authors a large degree of
control over their creations, even after they have parted with them.8
The seminal case of Buffet's Refrigerator provides the clearest illus-
tration of the integrity right.87 In Buffet, the Paris Cours d'appel pro-
hibited an auction house from selling one panel of a larger artwork, a
refrigerator comprised of six panels, and held that the public or private
disposition 8 of a work of art violates an artist's right to integrity. 89
(citing Judgment of April 29, 1959, Paris, J.C.P. II, at 11134, 402 note Lyon-Caen and
Lavigne, Rev. trim. dr. com. 1960, 350. obs. Desbois). Third parties may not modify
drawings by adding new colors or erasing parts of the rendering. Id. (citing Judgment
of Oct. 31, 1988, CDA 1988, at 22) (citation omitted). Courts prohibit producers from
interrupting television shows with commercial advertisements. Id. at 99 & n.245 (citing
Judgment of May 24, 1989, Trib. gr. inst. Paris, R.I.D.A. 1990, No. 143, at 353); see
also Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 196. Producers may not inlay logos on television
screens during broadcasts. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 99 & n.245.1 (citing
Judgment of Oct. 25, 1989, La cinq v. Marchand Paris, D.S. Jur. somm. 54, obs.
Colombet). Warnings cannot be added to screen credits. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note
2, at 98 & n.244.2 (citing Judgment of March 9, 1989, Societ6 Argos Films v. Capi
Films Paris, R.I.D.A. 1990, No. 143, at 310, D.S. Jur. somm. 55, obs. Colombet);
Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 192. Such activities may disrupt the enjoyment of
works and distort the intentions of the creators. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 98;
see Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 198-99 (stating that courts have ruled that the
display of logos during television shows violates Articles 6, 14, 16 and 47 of the 1957
Law); Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 192 (commenting that in some situations, it is
the setting or context in which the work is presented that violates the moral right). But
see Article 73 of the Law of Sept. 30, 1986, as amended by the Law of Jan. 17, 1989
(permitting one commercial break per broadcast).
83. See INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 95-96 (emphasizing the flexible criteria
and the discretionary nature of the right: "it is the author's free choice that triggers
protection").
84. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 190.
85. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 31; see supra note 82 (emphasizing the importance
that case law affords to the integrity right).
86. See INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 96 (emphasizing that "[t]he author
alone judges whether, and when, it is fitting to impart his work to the public .... and,
accordingly, in what form it should reach the public").
87. Merryman, supra note 4, at 1023 n.1 (citing Judgment of May 30, 1962 (Buf-
fet v. Fersing), Cours d'appel Paris, 1962 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 570, at 571). In
Buffet, the artist Bernard Buffet sought to enjoin the sale of a painted panel that was
separated from a larger work that he created some months earlier. Id. The larger work
was a refrigerator consisting of six decorated panels. Id. Buffet intended the refrigera-
tor to stand as a single piece of art, and accordingly, had signed only one of its panels.
Id.
88. Merryman, supra note 4, at 1023 n.1 (emphasizing the fact that the French
trial court only prohibited the panel's public disposition while the Cours d'appel ruled
that the right to integrity applies equally to private as well as public disposition).
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Despite the holding in Buffet, courts still find it difficult to determine
whether an artist's right to integrity has been violated.90 Such complex
situations most often arise when authors authorize third parties to cre-
ate adaptations of their work in other mediums (i.e., writers who per-
mit film adaptations of their books) 9' and are then dissatisfied with the
results. 92 While French courts have not found a single solution to this
growing problem,93 courts have generally required the adapter to exe-
cute contractual obligations in good faith;9' and to "refrain from dis-
torting the original work with the intention of doing harm; ... [and to
respect] the work's psychological tenor and the essence of the author's
thought."95 Many French scholars note that these requirements re-
present a dangerous trend.96 They force the trier of fact to judge aes-
89. Merryman, supra note 4, at 1023 n.l (citing Judgment of May 30, 1962 (Buf-
fet v. Fersing), Cours d'appel Paris, 1962 Recucil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 570, at 571). The
court also awarded Buffet symbolic damages of one franc, and gave him the right to
publish the court's decision in three art magazines of his choice at the defendant's
expense. Id. The court, however, refused to award Buffet the panels as he had hoped.
Id.
90. See Sarraute, supra note 41, at 481 (stating that when authors authorize adap-
tations of their work, courts often face problems in determining whether the integrity
right has been violated). In so doing, courts are compelled to address the tension be-
tween the philosophical desire to protect the moral right, and the practical desire to
permit adaptations and enforce contracts. Id. at 482.
91. Sarraute, supra note 41, at 481.
92. Sarraute, supra note 41, at 481. In a recent case involving the artist Salvador
Dali, the French courts were forced to determine the enforceability of a contract which
authorized the adaptation of his work. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 96 (citing
Judgment of May 11, 1965, Cours d'appel Paris, D.S. Jur., at 555, note Francon). Dali
sued the defendant theater company for whom he had created costumes, alleging that
the company's modifications to his designs damaged the integrity of his work. Id. The
Paris Cours d'appel rejected Dali's claim and held for the theater company, reasoning
that while "the author may oppose any correction or modification capable of altering
the character of the work," Dali could not recover since the company's alterations did
not result in an inaccurate portrayal of his designs. Id. In so doing, the court was
required to study and then compare Dali's original designs and the ensuing costumes.
Id.
93. Sarraute, supra note 41, at 481. The solution depends on an analsis of the
type of contract between the parties. Id.
94. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 35.
95. Sarraute, supra note 41, at 481; see Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 204 (stat-
ing the "the adapter must respect the spirit, style and composition of the original
work").
96. See Sarraute, supra note 41 at 482 (emphasizing that it is not the judge's place
to determine the significance of a work or to decide the essence of the work to be
respected). In response to the French case, Dialogues des Carmelites. Sarraute
cautioned:
The court found it necessary to determine whether the adaptation respected the
spirit of the adapted work, and proceeded to analyze and compare basic ele-
ments. . . .This dangerous undertaking is difficult to justify on theoretical
grounds. In fact, it is disquieting to see the courts take on such powers.
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thetics. By characterizing and comparing the artist's creations, the trier
of fact must decide whether an adaptation damages the reputation of
the author or the integrity of the author's original work.
7
II. THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990
A. BACKGROUND
Until 1990, United States jurisprudence did not embrace any form of
federal moral rights protection. 8 Lack of development of an American
doctrine of moral rights may be attributed, at least in part, to the con-
stitutional basis of the United States copyright system." The Copy-
right Clause in the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 100 The founding fathers of
the United States focused copyright laws on socially-desirable ends,'
aiming to create a balance between the desire to encourage artistic cre-
ativity and the need to promote the growth of ideas.' 02 They pursued
this goal by providing authors with property rights and limited monop-
oly in their works.' 03
97. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 36 (stating that courts rarely find that adapters
have abused their right to modify). Importantly, in finding for the adapter, courts rec-
ognize that authors may implicitly waive their moral rights. See infra note 261 (noting
that French courts regard moral rights as being alienable under certain circumstances).
98. See supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing the lack of federal moral
rights legislation).
99. See Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of Inno-
vation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REv.
1011, 1021-22 (1988) (noting the distinctive development of copyright law beginning
with its constitutional basis).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. United States law has never recognized the
French notion that authors inherently retain exclusive rights, simply because of their
status as creators; nor does it recognize any sacred bond between artists and their cre-
ations. See supra note 10 (noting United States rejection of moral rights); see infra
note 109 and accompanying text (explaining that traditionally, the United States has
treated artwork as a commodity, rather than as a unique expression of an author's
personality).
101. See Ginsburg, Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 22, at 992 (noting the
American emphasis on social utility as opposed to the French emphasis on the preser-
vation of artistic integrity).
102. Ginsburg, Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 22, at 992.
103. Ginsburg, Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 22, at 992.
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The American system of copyright,"0 ' rooted in positive rather than
natural law," 5 favors the economic"' over the personal interest of au-
thors. 07 The system protects the owner of the work rather than the
creator.108 Some commentators believe that moral rights laws, which
extend protection to authors in certain situations, 09 regardless of eco-
nomic or social impact, are inherently antithetical to this scheme.110
Accordingly, the United States has resisted adopting any form of
federal moral rights legislation."' Even after it acceded to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in March
104. See the United States Copyright Act (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810 (1992) (setting forth United States Copyright law)).
105. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 55. United States copyright exists "primarily to the
extent that the positive law creates it." Id. In France, copyright derives from natural
law. Ginsburg, Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 22, at 992-93.
106. Landau, supra note 45, at 221 & n.20. United States copyright law encour-
ages artistic creativity by providing incentives to authors to build upon the works of
others. Id.
107. See Ginsburg, Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 22, at 991-92 (explaining
that French copyright law enshrines the author while United States copyright law
grants exclusive rights to authors in order to maximize both the production of their
creations and public access to those creations).
108. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1989) (placing copyright interests in the hands of
the copyright owner) with 1957 Law (placing copyright interests in the hands of the
author). United States copyright law is "society oriented" whereas French copyright
law is "author oriented." Ginsburg, Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 22, at 993.
109. Beyer, supra note 99, at 1022. Moral rights legislation, by elevating and pro-
tecting the sacredness of the author's work, may accord too much protection to the
author, and not enough to: society's need for the promotion of new ideas, and society's
more traditional copyright, property, and economic interests. Id. at 1022-23. Critics
oppose the fact that, pursuant to moral rights legislation, art buyers may be foreclosed
from handling their purchases in certain ways (i.e., from mutilating their purchased
artwork) simply because artists retain moral rights in their creations. Rufus C. King,
The "Moral Rights" of Creators of Intellectual Property, 9 CARDOZO ARTs & EN-r.
L.J. 267, 272 (1991). Moral rights critics view art as chattel which should be com-
pletely alienable, whereas moral rights proponents view art as a unique object, insepa-
rable from its creator. See Marik, supra note 30, at 10 (illuminating the idea that
property rights in art differ, depending upon whether one views art as a special work of
the mind or as an ordinary commodity); Carl R. Baldwin, Art & the Law: Property
Right vs. "Moral Right", ART IN AMERICA, Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 34 (pinpointing the
tension that exists between the traditional American definition of property and the le-
gal constraints that the moral rights doctrine attaches to it).
110. See Eric Felton, New Law Gives Rights to Artist After Work is Sold, WASH.
TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1990, at El (quoting one critic as stating that while "'lilt may not be
desirable for people to purchase works of art and then act like idiots and destroy them,
... I have a real problem with the idea that a piece of property - which is ultimately
what a work of art is - cannot be treated as other pieces of property' ").
111. See Key Senators Frown on Adding Moral Rights to Copyright Act, PUB.
WKLY, Nov. 17, 1989, at 11 (noting Senate disapproval of moral rights legislation).
The United States refusal to adopt moral rights legislation proved particularly embar-
rassing in light of the number of other nations that have recognized either domestic or
international moral rights doctrine. Jane C. Ginsburg and John M. Kernochan, One
Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.
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of 1989,112 the United States refused to enact legislation to comply
with even the minimal moral rights standards" 3 outlined in the Con-
vention.'14 Congress justified its refusal to act by pronouncing that the
United States already offered adequate moral rights protection.'"
Leading commentators generally agree that this statement was clearly
untrue.1
The lack of federal moral rights legislation has not completely fore-
closed moral rights protection in the United States." 7 Some courts con-
sider moral rights claims into other recognized causes of action."18 Spe-
cifically, courts have protected an artist's right to integrity and
VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 2-3 (1988). As of 1989, the United States was the only non-
unionist Western country to have refused to accede to the Berne Convention. Id. at 3.
112. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, reprinted
in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, Guide to the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971) (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Berne Convention]. By the time the United States adopted the Convention, it had
already been adopted by more than seventy-seven nations. Van Velzen, supra note 16,
at 635 n.53.
The Berne Convention is the foremost treaty ensuring international copyright protec-
tion. Eric M. Brooks, "Tilted" Justice: Site Specific Art and Moral Rights After U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (1989).
113. The Berne Convention explicitly creates two categories of moral rights, integ-
rity and attribution. Ginsburg and Kernochan, supra note 110, at 2. See article 6bis:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modifications of, or other derogatory
action in relationship to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor
or reputation.
Berne Convention, supra note 112, art. 6bis.
To avoid such provisions, the United States promoted an alternative treaty, the Uni-
versal Copyright Convention, "a new international treaty largely tailored to the pecu-
liarities of U.S. law." Ginsburg and Kernochan, supra note 11, at 2-3.
114. Damich, supra note 13, at 945. See David Nimmer, The Impact of Berne on
United States Copyright Law, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 27, 29-30 (1989) (com-
menting that the United States reluctantly implemented the Berne Convention
"through the most stingy means available").
115. Damich, supra note 13, at 945; Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 478; H.R. Rep.
No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988); see Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the
Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law,
19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 524 (1967) (proposing that United States resistance to the
Berne Convention may have been prompted, in part, by opposition from the large and
influential motion picture and television industries).
116. Damich, supra note 13, at 946 & n.5. See supra notes 10, 118-24 and accom-
panying text (explaining that although some American courts have protected an artist's
moral rights through other causes of action, the lack of unified legislation has left sig-
nificant gaps in coverage).
117. Van Velzen, supra note 16, at 637-45.
118. Van Velzen, supra note 16, at 637; see James M. Treece, American Law Ana-
logues of the Author's "Moral Rights", 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487 (1968) (discussing
"substitute" rights); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an
American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17-38 (1985) (discussing
noncopyright alternatives for an artist's moral rights).
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paternity upon principles of defamation,119 contract,120 copyright," 1 un-
fair competition,1 22 and invasion of privacy.1 23 The majority of scholars
119. Kwall, supra note 118, at 23; DaSilva, supra note 4, at 44-45. The tort theory
of defamation has sometimes provided relief to artists in situations where the integrity
of their work has been violated or where their work has been altered or mutilated in a
manner that has caused harm to their professional reputations. See Edison v. Viva
Int'l, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979) (holding that the author could recover for libel when
publisher substantially changed and then printed author's article). But see DaSilva,
supra note 4, at 45 (voicing the view that protection under defamation law is of limited
utility; it is a reactive doctrine which does not enable artists to prevent the mutilation
of their work); Kwall, supra note 118, at 23 (agreeing that this substitute theory of
moral rights serves limited purposes since the burden of proof for the author is very
high; he or she must show "that the unauthorized act exposed him to contempt or
public ridicule, thus injuring his professional standing").
See also Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup.
Ct. 1948), affid, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). In Shostakovich, internationally famous So-
viet composers sought to enjoin the use of their uncopyrighted music in an anti-Soviet
film produced by Twentieth Century-Fox, alleging that use of their music in the film
cast upon them a "'false imputation of disloyalty to their country."' Shostakovich, 80
N.Y.S.2d at 578. The New York Supreme Court denied their requests for relief, stat-
ing that use of plaintiffs' music did not constitute libel since the public at large would
not associate the film with the composers political beliefs. Id. In so doing, the court
commented "that in the present state of our law the very existence of the [moral] right
is not clear." Id. at 579. It is interesting to note that the same composers brought suit
in France, and the opposite conclusion was reached. DaSilva, supra note 4, at I (citing
Judgment of Jan. 13, 1953 (Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe at Soc. Fox
Americaine Twentieth Century), Cours d'appel Paris, 1953 1 Gaz. Pal. 191, 1954 D.A.
Jur. 16, at 80). The Paris Cours d'appel, relying on the moral rights doctrine, granted
the Soviet composers an injunction. Id.
120. See Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978) (ruling
that publishing company breached its contract when it published unauthorized revised
version of author's book). Where authors have entered into contracts with third parties
that specifically address modification rights, courts may use contract theory to protect
the authors rights to integrity. Id. But see Kwall, supra note 118, at 21 (emphasizing
that "if the contract in question does not address modification rights, American courts
will protect a creator only against excessive mutilation of his work").
121. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). In
Gilliam, the authors of the British comedy Mont' Python sought to enjoin the televi-
sion broadcast of their film. Id. They alleged that the defendants had infringed their
copyright and violated the Lanham Act by substantially editing their work. Id. at 17-
18. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted the injunction,
reasoning that while the defendant television station had permission to use the copy-
righted script, it did not have permission to revise the original script. Id. at 20.
Some commentators believe that Gilliam reflects the beginning of American recogni-
tion and respect for the doctrine of moral rights. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 47-48.
122. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (using section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act to uphold the paternity right of the plaintiff actor, where the film
distributor removed the actor's name from the film's credits, and replaced it with an-
other); see also Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (creating a federal
cause of action for misrepresentation).
123. Kwall, supra note 118, at 18; DaSilva, supra note 4, at 45. Some courts have
used privacy laws to uphold moral rights (specifically, integrity rights) under the theory
that alteration of a work constitutes misappropriation of the author's name. Id. at 45.
See Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that unau-
thorized publication of works represented a violation of the author's right to privacy, as
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agree, however, that such "patchwork" coverage has not afforded au-
thors adequate moral rights protection.124
In recognition of the need for coherent and workable United States
moral rights legislation, Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representa-
tive Edward J. Markey introduced two moral rights bills into Con-
gress.125 Both bills, fashioned after California legislation, 28 recognized
two components of the moral right, the right to paternity and the right
to integrity.'27 Although the bills failed to gain enough support for pas-
well as a breach of contract); see also Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504
(2d Cir. 1977) (enjoining distribution of John Lennon recording where that recording
had been poorly edited).
124. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 6; Kwall, supra note 118, at 17-18 & n.68; see
Leaffer, supra note 68, at 241-42 (noting that "[t]he assertion that the entirety of
American law taken as a whole provides defacto protection of the author's moral right
is inaccurate at best"); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 157 (2d ed. 1987) (arguing "that 'theoretical' equivalents of
the moral right do not compare"). See also TAD CRAWFORD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE
VISUAL ARTIST 44-47 (revised ed. 1989) (illustrating through an interview with artist,
Alfred Crimi, that the United States offered no protection against the destruction of a
work by its owner).
125. Van Velzen, supra note 16, at 654; Damich, supra note 13, at 946-47. Both
bills were called The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REc. SI , 502-03 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1987).
Similar moral rights legislation had been introduced in Congress in preceding years,
in 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1986 and 1987. Jack A. Cline, The Long and Winding
Road Toward Recognition, 14 NOVA L. REV. 435, 441 (1990); Leaffer, supra note 68,
at 239.
126. See the California Art Preservation Act of 1979, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987
(West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (delineating California's moral rights legislation). Califor-
nia was the first of ten states to adopt moral rights legislation. See also CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 42-116s through 42-116t (Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2151
through 2156 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85S (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 through 2A:24A-8
(West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 through 13-4B-3 (Michie 1988); N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ I1.01, 14.03 (McKinney 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 §§
2101-10 (Supp. 1991); and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 through 5-62-6 (1987) (de-
lineating subsequent state moral rights statutes).
127. Van Velzen, supra note 16, at 665-66.
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sage in 1989,128 on October 27, 1990, Congress passed"'9 the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).1
3 0
B. ANALYSIS
The Visual Artists Rights Act serves as an important first step to-
wards protection of moral rights. 13' In the VARA, the United States
recognizes that art differs from other forms of ordinary property, and
thus demands that it be given special forms of protection in certain
cases. 132 Accordingly, the VARA arms authors of visual works of art
with the right to claim paternity of their work and to preserve the in-
tegrity of their creations. 133 While the VARA, by its very passage,
must be commended for introducing a new doctrine of jurisprudence
into the United States legal system, it must also be scrutinized and
criticized. 4 The VARA remains limited in several respects: it protects
only visual works of art rather than all artistic, literary or intellectual
creations;135 it does not provide authors with absolute rights of anonym-
ity,1 36 pseudonymity,"3 7 or require faithful reproduction of works; 138 it
128. Damich, supra note 13, at 946. Groups that opposed the bill included the
publishing, broadcasting and movie industries. Cline, supra note 125, at 443; Ginsburg,
supra note 12, at 479. Several groups, however, supported the 1989 bill including the
AFL-CIO Department of Professional Employees, the American Institute for Conser-
vation of Historic and Artistic Works, American Society of Magazine Photographers,
Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts, California Confederation of the Arts, Graphic Artists
Guild, National Artists Equity Association, New York Artists Equity Association, So-
ciety of Illustrators, Visual Artists & Galleries Association, and the Volunteer Lawyers
for the Arts. Cline, supra note 125, at 440 n.45.
129. S. 1198, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6811-13 (daily ed. June 16,
1989); H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. H3111-16 (daily ed. June 5,
1990).
130. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990), 104
Stat. 5130, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506, 608-610
(West Supp. 1992).
131. Damich, supra note 13, at 947; see Marik, supra note 30, at 7 & n.7 (quoting
James Minden, President of the National Artists Equity Association, as saying that
passage of the VARA "represents a major coup in terms of our government acknowl-
edging the importance of the arts"); New Rights For Artists, ART NEws, Feb. 1991, at
35 (quoting Nancy Adelson, attorney and Associate Director of Legal Services of Vol-
unteer Lawyers for the Arts, as stating -[i]t's probably the most important legislation
that's been passed for artists' rights ever in this country").
132. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing property rights in art).
133. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a).
134. Damich, supra note 13, at 947.
135. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (defining "work of visual art"); Leaffer, supra note 68,
at 235 (noting that the term "visual artist," as used in the United States moral rights
legislation, is a misnomer because only fine artists, rather than all visual artists
benefit).
136. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(l), (2) (providing authors with the following lim-
ited rights: the right to claim authorship, the right to prevent the use of their names
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stipulates that duration of protection lasts only for the life of the au-
thor; 9 and it provides for the waiver of rights.1 40 Study and compari-
son of the VARA in light of the French droit moral illuminate further
limitations.
1. Subject Matter
The VARA protects artists when they create "works of visual
art."'' The VARA defines works of visual art as paintings, drawings,
prints and sculptures, existing in limited edition of two hundred or
fewer prints, consecutively numbered and signed; 4 ' and photographs
produced for exhibition purposes only. 43 The VARA explicitly ex-
cludes from coverage, among other things, literary works, movies and
other audiovisual works, advertisements, posters, diagrams, works made
for hire, data bases, and electronic publications.1 44 The definition of
with works they did not create, and the right to prevent the use of their names with
works that have been distorted, mutilated or destroyed).
137. Id.
138. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(3).
139. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d).
140. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e); Damich, supra note 13, at 947.
141. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (a)(1) (providing that "the author of a work of vis-
ual art shall have the right[s]" described therein).
142. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. A "work of visual art" is:
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture .... in a limited edition of 200 copies
or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the
case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of two hun-
dred or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signa-
ture or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in
a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
Id.
143. Id. The standard limiting protection to photographs produced for "exhibition
purposes" is meant to exclude ordinary photographs such as snapshots. Damich, supra
note 13, at 977. Although consistent with other language in the VARA (i.e., "of recog-
nized stature"), this "quality of art criterion" was probably unnecessary. Id. See gener-
ally' infra note 173 and accompanying text (explaining that the VARA could have
achieved the same ends, namely the "barring of law suits arising from the destruction
of works of visual art of an amateurish or pedestrian character" by less restrictive
means).
144. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. A "work of visual art" does not include:
(A) (i) any poster, map globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied
art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, peri-
odical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication;
(ii) any merchandizing item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, gov-
erning, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
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work of visual art, as embodied in examples of what it does and does
not protect, reveals an intent to apply moral rights protection to what
most of society conceives of as "art," rather than to all objects of mass
production.1 15 The VARA achieves this by limiting moral rights cover-
age to particular original works (and up to two hundred limited edition
copies) of fine art. 146 The VARA does not extend protection to works
defined as "craft," 147 or to reproductions or exploitations of works.1 48
As a result, if an artist, for example, sells a painting, and the pur-
chaser subsequently takes and publishes a photograph of his or her
purchase that distorts the coloration of the painting, under the VARA,
the artist's moral rights have not been violated since the distortion re-
sulted from the photograph, and not from harm to the original piece of
art. 149 Similarly, if a photographer produced an image for exhibition
purposes, nothing within the VARA could prevent a third party from
copying that photograph and pasting it onto placemats or imprinting it
upon t-shirts.'50
The VARA's definition of visual work of art also reveals an intent to
"reassure large exploiters, such as publishers of periodicals, that they
need not fear. . for their publications."" It does so by explicitly ex-
cluding from coverage motion pictures, audiovisual works, and works
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
id.
145. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 480 & n.19. The VARA protects "visual works
appreciated solely as works of art, not useful articles or works used for commercial
purposes, and generally, visual works in their original versions rather than reproduc-
tions." Damich, supra note 13, at 951.
146. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
147. See Martha Buskirk, Moral Rights: First Step or False Start?, ART I.N
AMERICA, July 1991, at 37 & n.3 (citing Leonard DuBoffs criticism of the fact that
the VARA would, for example, protect a bronze sculpture but not the work of a well
respected potter).
148. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A. "The rights described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub-
section (a) shall not apply to any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a
work in, upon, or in any connection with any. . . 'work of visual art'...." Id.
149. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 481-82 (concurring that "an art book pub-
lisher who prints a substantially discolored version of a painting, or a poster manufac-
turer who enlarges and reproduces a small portion of the work, or a magazine publisher
who prints only half a photograph, would incur no liability under the Act"); Robert A.
Gorman, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 38 J. COPYRIGHT. Soc'" 233, 239 (1990)
(agreeing that "the right of integrity does not embrace the right to protest reproduc-
tions, even if distorted").
150. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 482 (noting that such actions "may constitute
copyright infringement of the derivative work's right, but a copyright claim avails the
artist only if she retains the pertinent copyright interest").
151. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 480. See Nimmer, supra note 114, at 524 (stating
that the motion picture and television industries opposed moral rights legislation).
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made for hire.152 The VARA offers no protection, for example, to film-
makers who wish to prevent their films from being colorized, or to tele-
vision writers who wish to prevent their programs from being inter-
rupted by commercials, or superimposed with logos.
5 3
2. Rights Protected
The VARA provides authors of visual works of art with two princi-
pal moral rights, the rights of paternity and integrity. 54
The right to paternity, the crux of the right to respect, provides the
artist with numerous rights. For instance, the right to paternity: (I)
permits an artist to claim or disclaim authorship of his or her work;165
(2) serves to prevent the artist's name from being attached to work
which he or she did not create; 5 ' and (3) prevents the artist's name
from being attached to a work which he or she has created, but which
has been distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified in a manner that
152. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. This last category, in and of itself, would most likely dis-
qualify films and television broadcasts from receiving moral rights benefits, since the
making of movies and television programs routinely entails the collaboration of dozens
of "instrumental players," (writers, directors, producers, set-designers, costume design-
ers, make-up artists, etc.) people working for a common employer. Marik, supra note
30, at 8.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989). A "work made for hire" is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a col-
lective work, as part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a compilation. ...
id.
See also Damich, supra note 13, at 964-66 (positing that the intention of the work
for hire provision of the VARA, which may have been to deny moral rights protection
to non-creating employers, has somewhat anomalous implications in that it also denies
moral rights protection to creating employees).
153. See supra note 144, and accompanying text (explaining that the VARA ex-
cludes motion pictures and audiovisual works, such as television programs, from
coverage).
154. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A.
155. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a).
156. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a).
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prejudices his or her honor.017 The right to paternity does not provide
authors with the right to remain anonymous or use a pseudonym. 0 8
The right to integrity guarantees an artist that his or her artistic
vision will be preserved."' 9 It protects the physical sanctity of the art-
ist's creation. 160 Specifically, the VARA provides artists with rights
against both modification and destruction of their work, and establishes
different standards for each.' Thus, the artists' burden of proof varies,
depending upon whether they allege that their work has been altered or
entirely destroyed.' 62
An author of a visual work of art has the right to prevent any inten-
tional distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work, when
such action would result in prejudice to his or her honor.'" 3 This provi-
sion contains two conditions. First, the artist's work must have been
intentionally mutilated, destroyed or modified." Thus, artists have no
recourse against mutilation or deterioration of their work resulting
157. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a). The showing of "prejudice to his or her honor,"
which derives from Berne Convention language, rather than from more traditional
moral rights doctrine, will most likely raise many practical and evidentiary issues.
Marik, supra note 30, at 8. Courts, as the triers of fact, will be forced to reach ex-
tremely subjective conclusions - whether the alleged actions have harmed an artist's
reputation. See id. (stating that "[u]nder U.S. law there are few guideposts by which
the courts can judge this standard, thus causing much confusion and abuse").
In comparison, French law imposes no such subjective standards. 1957 Law, supra
note 24, art. 6. Article 6 of the 1957 Law simply states that "It]he author shall enjoy
the respect for his name, his authorship, and his work." Id.
158. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 6. Note that this paternity right exists whether
or not the distortion, mutilation or modification of the artist's work is intentional,
whereas the integrity right applies only where the alteration of the artist's work is
intentional. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text (describing the attributes of
the integrity right). See also Damich, supra note 13, at 958-60 (commenting that the
right of attribution is not consistent with the right of integrity).
159. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(2), (3) (setting forth the integrity right); Marik,
supra note 30, at 8-9 (stating that the integrity right provides authors with the right to
prevent others from mutilating, altering, distorting, or destroying their work).
160. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 31 & n.209 (explaining that the integrity right
provides authors with the right to preserve their work against "any alteration or muti-
lation whatsoever").
161. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(2), (3).
162. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(2), (3).
163. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(A). Generally, the right to integrity differs from
the right to paternity in that the former usually centers on the physical alteration of
the work itself, whereas the latter usually involves more general violations of the right
to respect - including the association of the author's name with a work that is not his;
or that has been altered or destroyed so that the author would not want his name
associated with that work. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing
the use of the paternity and integrity right in traditional French moral rights context).
164. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
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from the passage of time or the inherent nature of materials,6 5 or from
efforts of conservation or public presentation, 6' since intent is absent
from such forms of modifications. 7
Second, such mutilation, destruction or modification must prejudice
the author's honor or reputation. 68 Commentators agree that this stan-
dard will probably be difficult to meet. 61 It requires that artists show,
not only that their work has been somehow altered, but that such alter-
ations damage the way that they are perceived by the community.1
70
Thus, this language may prevent an author from receiving moral rights
protection, even after her work has been physically modified, in cases
where the court finds that such modifications either enhance the artist's
reputation or increase the monetary value of his or her work.'
7 '
The right to integrity further provides authors of visual works of art
with the right to prevent destruction of their work, if their work "is of
recognized stature. '1 72 This standard "of recognized stature," which
165. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(1). "The modification of a work of visual art which is
a result of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials is not a distor-
tion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsection (a)(3)(A)." Id.
166. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(2). "The modification of a work of visual art which is
the result of conservation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and place-
ment, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification
described in subsection (a)(3) unless the modification is caused by gross negligence."
Id.
167. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining the intent factor of the
integrity right). The VARA thus absolves, for example, museums and galleries from
liability for damage done to works under their control, unless such damage was caused
by gross negligence. See Gorman, supra note 148, at 235 (stating that the public pres-
entation of a work - i.e., poor lighting or placement - does not meet the intent
requirement). A question still remains, however, as to what constitutes gross negli-
gence, (i.e., whether negligent upkeep of works triggers protection). Id. at 235-36.
168. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(A). The VARA also uses this "prejudice to his or
her honor or reputation" standard to judge violations of the paternity right. See supra
notes 155-58 and accompanying text (describing the paternity right).
169. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (explaining the practical and evi-
dentiary problems presented by this subjective standard); Gorman, supra note 149, at
234-35 (stating that "reputational harm might be difficult to prove").
170. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (providing that any mutilation, distortion
or modifications must prejudice the author's honor or reputation).
171. See Buskirk, supra note 147, at 39 & n.12 (relating the VARA to an incident
involving deceased American sculptor, David Smith, whereby the executor of Smith's
estate stripped the paint off of several of Smith's sculptures in order to increase the
sculptures' value, despite Smith's prior objection to such changes); Rosalind Krauss,
Changing the Work of David Smith, ART IN AMERICA, Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 30-33 (dis-
cussing the alterations of Smith's work; urging laws to protect the integrity of artists).
172. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(B); Damich, supra note 13, at 953 & n.40. While
the VARA does not define "of recognized stature," legislative history indicates that
courts must determine whether works are "of recognized stature," and that they should
base such a determination upon the opinions of art historians or experts:
[A] court or other trier of fact may take into account the opinions of artists, art
dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, conservators of recog-
[VOL. 8:183
1992] ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT 207
was intended to bar nuisance suits,17 3 creates both ideological and prac-
tical problems by infusing a form of quality criterion into the doctrine
of moral rights. 174 It is well settled that courts should refrain from be-
coming arbiters of aesthetics. 17 5 Justice Holmes stated over ninety
years ago in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,170 that deci-
sions based on artistic merit "cut against a long copyright tradition
eschewing value or aesthetic judgements about works or authorship."'
177
The "of recognized stature" provision is objectionable, not only because
it cuts against tradition, but because it raises difficult evidentiary is-
sues. Triers of fact will be forced to weigh the testimony of art experts
and community members in order to decide whether the work meets
the standard.
178
The VARA provides special provisions for the integrity right as it
relates to works of visual art that have been incorporated into architec-
nized stature, and other persons involved with the creation, appreciation, history,
or marketing of works of recognized stature.
S. 1198, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6811-13 (daily ed. June 16, 1989).
It is significant to note that under French law, there is no explicit protection against
the destruction of a work of art. See Treece, supra note 118, at 498 (positing that
under French law, artists could prevent their murals from being mutilated, but not
destroyed).
173. Damich, supra note 13, at 954-55. The provision prevents, for example, the
parents of a five year old from seeking to enjoin the destruction of their child's artwork.
Id. (criticizing that this advantage was not "important enough for Congress to limit the
right to prevent distortion, mutilation, or other modification to works of recognized
stature"). Congress could have achieved the same result by less restrictive means, i.e.,
by reducing recoverable damages to the market value of the work. Id. at 955.
174. See Damich, supra note 13, at 955 (explaining that "[mIoral rights derive
from the fact that a work is an expression of the artist's personality." Thus, an insignif-
icant, unappreciated work is no less an expression of the artist's personality, and is of
no less value, than is a work "of recognized stature"); see also Ginsburg, supra note
12, at 480 n.19 (stating that the "of recognized stature" standard penalizes artists who
are unknown).
It is important to note that while French courts sometimes make aesthetic judgments
(see notes 92-96 and accompanying text) such judgments are not imposed by statute;
rather, they result from practical problems in the application of the law.
175. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). See in-
fra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining the dangers that accompany such
judgments).
176. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. at 251.
177. Id. at 251-52. Justice Holmes further stated:
[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some
works. . . .would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make
them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which the au-
thor spoke.
Id. at 251.
178. Damich, supra note 13, at 953 & n.40.
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tural structures.'79 Assume that the artist cannot remove his or her
work from the structure without damaging the creation's integrity. If
the artist entered into a written contract with the owner of the build-
ing, acknowledging that future removal of the work might modify or
destroy it, then the owner may continue to renovate or demolish her
property without violating the artist's moral rights.18 ° If, on the other
hand, the work is not removable and the artist and the owner did not
enter into a contract regarding the possible destruction of the work,
then moral rights attach to the work.' 8 In this instance, the owner
must notify the artist prior to destruction of the building, so that the
artist has a chance to rescue the work. 82 Where the artist can remove
the work without damaging its physical integrity, the law similarly pro-
vides that the owner of the building in which the work is located must
notify the artist and allow time to claim the work.183
3. Features
The VARA prohibits the transfer of the rights of attribution and
integrity; however, it permits the waiver of those same rights.8 4 The
waiver provision makes it clear, however, that such renunciation of
179. 17 U.S.C.A. § I13(d). This right comes into play when property owners plan
to renovate or demolish buildings containing artworks such as large sculptures or fres-
coes. See Ginsburg supra note 12, at 485-86 (describing the right of integrity as it
applies to artwork that has been incorporated into buildings).
180. 17 U.S.C.A. § 113 (d)(1). In this situation, the law does not even require that
the owner notify the artist of his or her intentions. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 486
(stating that, in effect, the law here seeks to prevent the artist from holding the build-
ing hostage to the artworks it contains).
181. 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d).
182. 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d)(2)(B). Upon notification, the artist has 90 days to re-
move the work from the site. Id.
Thomas M. Goetzel, author of draft legislation which became the California Art
Preservation Act, criticizes this provision. Thomas M. Goetzel, Peril of Art: Federal
and State Laws Protecting Artists' Rights in Their Creations Can Create Traps for
Unwary Owners, THE RECORDER, Oct. 8, 1991, at 8. He states, that by providing art-
ists with the power to prevail over the needs of the building owner, the VARA "be-
hooves the owner of any real property who contemplates commissioning the addition of
any art work" to either insure that the work is removable, or to obtain a contract
absolving him or her of damage which might result from its removal. Id.
183. 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d)(2). Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 486.
184. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e) [hereinafter waiver provision]. The statute reads:
Transfer and Waiver - (1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be
transferred, but those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such
waiver in a written instrument signed by the author. Such instrument shall spe-
cifically identify the work, and uses of that work, to which the waiver applies,
and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so identified. ...
[VOL. 8:183
ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT
rights must be specific and advertent."' Any waiver must fulfill three
requirements: (1) it must be in writing; (2) signed by the author; and
(3) identify the work and the uses to which the waiver applies.1 86 The
burden of obtaining a waiver falls on the buyer.' 87 Thus, if a waiver is
not executed, then the artist retains all moral rights in his or her
work. 188 Due to the controversial nature of the provision,119 the VARA
provides for a study of the waiver provision to be conducted by the
Copyright Office. 90 This study will determine the waiver's effect and
whether its use becomes so prevalent as to undermine the aim of the
VARA.' 91
The VARA has other significant features. It limits the duration of
moral rights protection to the life of the author,' and provides that
185. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e).
186. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e). See also Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 488 (projecting
that general waivers, i.e., "I hereby forego all my rights, title and interest in this
work," will not be enforceable).
187. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 488-89 (positing that the law's "reversal of
the initial position" may benefit artists, since they often commission works by way of
informal arrangements).
188. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 488. While this provision provides artists with the
advantage of a presumption in favor of moral rights, it also burdens them with a great
disadvantage. Id. Artists may be pressured into relinquishing their rights because many
of them have less bargaining power than the people who purchase their art. Gorman,
supra note 149, at 237.
See Buskirk, supra note 146, at 43 (stating that artists who have employed their own
contracts and demanded certain rights - i.e., reproduction or resale rights - have lost
patrons because of their unwillingness to agree to such contracts). See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101-05 (3d ed. 1986) (elaborating upon the
dynamics of unequal bargaining power). But see Beyer, supra note 98, at 1047 n.103
(questioning whether artists' lack of bargaining power provides a sufficient basis for
government intervention).
189. See supra note 188 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the
waiver provision); see also Gorman, supra note 149, at 237 (emphasizing the concern
felt by moral rights proponents that purchasers of art would routinely exert enormous
pressure upon artists to relinquish their statutory rights).
190. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, title VI, §
608(a), 104 Stat. 5132 (providing for study by Copyright Office on waiver of rights
provision).
191. Id. The VARA also approved a study on resale royalties, to consider the feasi-
bility of enabling artists, such as authors and composers, to collect royalties from sub-
sequent as well as initial sales of their work. 17 U.S.C.A. § 608(b); see Leafier, supra
note 68, at 235-38 (discussing the resale royalties issue). While French law has an
equivalent of a resale royalties right (known as the droit de suite), that right remains
independent from the moral right. MERRYMAN AND ELSEN, supra note 124, at 213;
Beyer, supra note 99, at 1046 n.95 (suggesting that this separation perpetuates the idea
that an author should not benefit economically from a moral right).
192. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(l). "[T]he rights conferred by subsection (a) shall
endure for a term consisting of the life of the author." Id. The Copyright Act, in con-
trast, extends copyright protection for the life of the author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302 (a) (1988). Under the Berne Convention, moral rights last after the death of the
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only the artist has standing to enforce his or her rights.193 If an artist
decides to invoke his or her moral rights, the VARA provides that he
or she may do so without registration where the artist properly deliv-
ered the application to the Copyright office, and where the Copyright
Office rejected the application. 194 Under these circumstances, the
VARA provides that the artist may sue for standard civil remedies,
including injunction, damages, and/or profits.'9 5 The VARA also con-
tains a preemption provision,' stating that the VARA will preempt
only those states' rights that are equivalent to the VARA's. 97
III. COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE
A. SUBJECT MATTER AND STRUCTURE
The French droit moral, as codified in the 1957 Law, protects au-
thors' moral rights in almost any creation. 9 The United States VARA
extends coverage to only one category of works, visual works of fine
art.'99 Many commentators find it difficult to justify the VARA's omis-
author until the expiration of the economic rights. See Berne Convention, supra note
111, art. 6bis, para. 2.
For joint authors, the VARA extends protection through the life of the last surviving
author. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(3). And, upon the death of the author, moral rights
extend to the end of the calendar year. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(4).
193. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(b). "Only the author of a work of visual art has the
rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copy-
right owner .. " Id.
194. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a).
195. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b). The VARA adopts the remedies provided by the Copy-
right Act, but excludes criminal penalties. 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(f); see Damich, supra
note 13, at 970 (explaining that the VARA does not need criminal penalties to enforce
its provisions).
196. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(f)(1), (2).
197. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(f)(1), (2). Thus, the VARA will not abrogate state laws
that provide moral rights protection for a term beyond the life of the author. 17
U.S.C.A. § 301 (f)(2)(c); see Damich, supra note 13, at 972-73 (positing that the pre-
emption provision will be given a narrow interpretation: it will only preempt those
rights that "exactly correspond" to the rights recognized in the VARA).
198. 1957 Law, supra note 24, arts. 2, 3. The 1957 Law extends moral rights pro-
tection to all works of the mind - to books, poems, movies, fine art, crafts, site-specific
sculpture, lectures - regardless of whether or not the works are visual, signed, or
numbered, or exist in unlimited editions. Id. French law does not differentiate between
traditional or non-traditional art forms, and does not discriminate against authors
based on their reputation, or the degree to which their work is recognized. Id. art. 2;
Damich, supra note 13, at 975.
199. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 106A. There are limitations even within that category.
Works must be signed by the author and can only exist in editions of two hundred or
fewer. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. But see Marik, supra note 30, at 8 & n.12 (citing H.R. No.
101-514, in which Congress states it will interpret subject matter broadly, i.e., it will
deem a painting on a canvas or a wall or any surface "a painting" worthy of protection
under the statutory definition of a work of visual art).
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sion of other categories of works.211 If the intent of the moral right is to
protect authors' interests in their work, even after they no longer physi-
cally possess the work, then the right should extend to all forms of
authorship," ' including all visual, musical, 20 2 and literary creations.2 0 3
Commentators agree with the theoretical argument that all works of
the mind should receive moral rights protection. 2°' From a practical
stand point, however, they also acknowledge that the VARA's exclu-
sion of certain categories of authorship is understandable.10 Collabora-
tive works, such as motion pictures, for example, do not easily fit within
the moral rights paradigm. 20 6 Even France has encountered difficulties
in tailoring its moral right laws to accommodate collaborative works
because they are usually the product of many authors.20 ' Other works,
200. See Damich supra note 13, at 953 (commenting that the VARA's subject
matter of protection is extremely narrow); Buskirk, supra note 147, at 37-39, 41-43
(criticizing the VARA's exclusion of less traditional art forms from protection).
Legislative history suggests that some of the VARA's limitations (subject matter of
protection, restrictive standards, etc.) stem from a fear that wider coverage would open
the doors to a flood of litigation. Damich, supra note 13, at 954-55. Such fears are not
well founded. Id. The French experience has shown that while the system is open to
great abuse, (INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 100), since it is based entirely on the
discretion of the author, abuse is rare. See supra note 173 and accompanying text
(discussing nuisance suits).
201. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that moral
rights stem from personality rights, which attach to all authors, and not just to visual
artists).
202. See Jeffrey L. Graubart, U.S. Artists: Fight for Moral Rights, BILLBOARD
MAGAZINE, July 13, 1991, at 10 (urging musical artists to fight for legislation to en-
sure their moral rights).
203. But see Michael R. Klipper, Berne Measure Doesn't Incorporate New Moral
Rights Into U.S. Law, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1990, at 19 (explaining that the
VARA's exclusion of works such as books and records is understandable, since those
creations typically exist in multiple copies).
204. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 126-28 (explaining that the moral right
is a natural right which attaches to any author upon any act of creation).
205. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (explaining that the introduc-
tion of moral rights into United States law creates significant practical problems). Po-
litical as well as practical reasons (i.e., opposition to the VARA by the film industry)
may further account for certain limitations in moral rights coverage. See David
Goldberg and Robert J. Bernstein, Legislation by the 101st Congress, NEw YORK
LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 18, 1991, at 3 (stating that "there is intense and extensive opposi-
tion to extending specific moral rights protection to audiovisual and other works").
206. Karlen, supra note 2, at 242-51 (explaining that since collaborative works are
created by various authors, problems regarding ownership and authorship, in terms of
both personal and economic rights, inevitably arise); DaSilva, supra note 4, at 16, 33
(discussing problems raised by collaborative works). See infra note 206 and accompa-
nying text (addressing the fact that collaborative works raise special difficulties since
they are the product of more than one or two identifiable authors).
207. See Sarraute, supra note 41, at 473-76 (stating that the rights involved with
collaborative works such as motion pictures remain very difficult); see also 1957 Law,
supra note 24, arts. 15 and 16 (establishing an exception for audiovisual works).
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such as computer programs, raise similar practical problems.20 8 More
generally, the drafters of the VARA may have limited the VARA's
coverage to only visual works of art, in an effort to determine whether
moral rights can be successfully integrated into United States law. 20 9
The 1957 Law and the VARA differ, not only in terms of subject
matter protected, but also in terms of the breadth of coverage afforded
by the laws.210 Whereas the 1957 Law explicitly provides that it shall
protect the rights of all authors, regardless of the merit or purpose of
their work,211 the VARA provides that it shall protect only those au-
thors whose work is of "recognized stature" or whose reputation or
honor has been threatened.21 2 The VARA's restrictions -"prejudice to
honor or reputation" and "of recognized stature" - have been widely
criticized.21 3 Scholars agree that they are ambiguous2"4 and over-
broad;215 and that they create practical evidentiary problems.216 The
restrictions also contravene basic moral rights doctrine by extending
208. See Karlen, supra note 2, at 245-46 (stating that problems often arise with
regard to computer programs because more than one person creates the product).
209. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 479 ("adopting explicit moral rights in a
limited domain might afford an opportunity to experiment with adapting U.S. law to
moral rights, and might provide experiences permitting further cautious adoption of
moral rights in other copyright fields"); Damich, supra note 13, at 953-54 (concurring
that the limited coverage presently afforded by the VARA "is a logical starting
point").
210. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (restricting the right of attribution to acts
which prejudice the author's honor or reputation and restricting the integrity right to
acts which destroy works of recognized stature) and 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 2
(imposing no such restrictions).
211. See 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 2. "The provisions of this law shall protect
the right of authors of all intellectual works, regardless of their kind, form of expres-
sion, merit or purpose." Id.
212. See supra notes 157, 161-79 and accompanying text (addressing the two qual-
itative standards employed by the VARA).
213. See Damich, supra note 13, at 954-55 (critiquing the VARA's "recognized
stature" provision). These standards are also problematic because they are inconsistent.
Buskirk, supra note 147, at 37 & n.4. The paternity right and the "modification" sub-
section of the integrity right define violations in terms of "prejudice to his or her honor
or reputation," whereas the "destruction" subsection of the integrity right defines viola-
tions in terms of "recognized stature." Id.; see also id. at 37 n.4 (citing the opinion of
art-law expert Susan Duke Biederman, who believes that of the two standards, "of
recognized stature" will be easier to prove).
214. Buskirk, supra note 147, at 37; see Bruce Fein, Illusory Guarantee for Artis-
tic Rights, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at GI (criticizing the authorship of the VARA,
and questioning, for example, whether "recognition" in regard to the "of recognized
stature" standard must be local, national or international; or whether it applies to the
arts community, or to the general public).
215. See, e.g., Damich, supra note 13, at 977-78 (noting that remedy provisions
can be more finely tuned than artistic merit criteria). Drafters of the VARA could
have achieved the same ends, such as prevention of nuisance suits and a flood of litiga-




certain rights to only select authors, depending upon the author's repu-
tation or the merit of their work.217 In contrast, the 1957 Law provides
broad and uniform protection. It does not distinguish between different
types of works of the mind.2"' All creations, whether they be books,
sculptures, buildings, photographs, or music scores, are subject to the
same provisions.119
Furthermore, whereas the 1957 Law groups all works of the mind
into one category, offering equal protection to all,220 the VARA sepa-
rates visual works of art into various categories, providing different
standards of protection for each. 221 For example, the VARA distin-
guishes art that has been incorporated into buildings from art that has
not been incorporated into buildings.222 Such categorization creates
problems whereby some types of works, such as site-specific art,223 are
not protected by any category. 224 Site-specific works are pieces that are
designed to fit into particular environmental locations. 225 Since such
works are theoretically inseparable from the space which they are
designed to occupy, removal of these works from their environment
216. See supra note 157, 161-78 and accompanying text (describing the practical
problems raised by the standards). Courts will have to judge whether an artist's reputa-
tion has been harmed, or whether his or her work meets the "recognized stature" stan-
dard. Id.
217. Buskirk, supra note 147, at 41. For example, if an artist seeks to prevent her
work from being destroyed, she will first have to show the court that it is "of recog-
nized stature." Damich, supra note 13, at 953. Thus, an unknown artist cannot expect
to receive the same moral rights protection as a more established colleague. Id.
The law's recourse to traditional definitions of art "means that the works of many
artists, especially those working in non-traditional mediums" are not protected. Bus-
kirk, supra note 147, at 41, 43; see also Marik, supra note 30, at 9 (agreeing that the
standard is self-defeating because works that are dismissed as of minor stature one day,
may be of great stature the next).
218. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 2.
219. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 2.
220. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 2.
221. See supra notes 179-183 (describing the different standards that apply to
works that are and are not separable from the structures in which they were built and
the effects of such categorization on site-specific artworks).
222. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 13(d)(1)(A), (B), and (d)(2).
223. See infra notes 223-226 and accompanying text (elaborating upon the treat-
ment of site-specific art under both French and United States law).
224. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 486 (stating that she believes that the draft-
ers of the VARA anticipated, "but left unstated," this gap in coverage).
225. Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir.
1988) (quoting site-specific artist, Richard Serra). They are works "conceived and cre-
ated in relation to the particular conditions of a specific site." Id.
In Serra, a pre-VARA case, Serra sought and was denied an injunction against the
removal of his sculpture, "Tilted Arc," from the Federal Plaza in Manhattan. Id. Indi-
viduals complained that the work, a 120 foot long slab of curved steel, obstructed previ-
ously open space. Id.; Brooks, supra note 112, at 1431.
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damages their integrity, regardless of whether the work has been physi-
cally altered. 2 6
Under the VARA, site-specific works will, most likely, remain unpro-
tected.227 Under French Law, however, site-specific works are protected
to the same degree as all other works of the mind.228 In France, if a
court decides to accord different considerations to different types of
works, such decisions are judicially, rather than statutorily, imposed.220
This flexible approach, surprisingly, permits courts to provide artists
with more uniform moral rights protection.230
The 1957 Law protects the authors of intellectual works rather than
the work itself.23 The VARA similarly protects authors of visual works
226. See Brooks, supra note 112, at 1431-32 (quoting Richard Serra as stating, "I
don't make portable objects. . . .I am interested in a behavioral space in which the
viewer interacts with the sculpture in its context"); see also Steven Gibaldi, Artists'
Moral Rights and Film Colorization: Federal Legislative Efforts to Provide Visual
Artists With Moral Rights and Resale Royalties, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 965, 966 n.4
(1987) ("[r]elocating a site-specific work robs it of its raison d'etre and is a form of
artistic mutilation").
227. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 486-87. If Serra was tried today, under the
VARA, a court would most likely reach the same conclusion. "Tilted Arc" would be
classified as an "unremovable" work and would therefore remain "outside the ambit of
integrity rights." Id. at 487; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d)(1) (defining unremovable
work).
228. See supra note 36 (quoting the passage of the 1957 Law which provides that
all works of the mind receive equal protection). In the seminal case, Dubuffet v. R6gie
Nationales des Usines Renault, the French Cour de cassation held that the Renault
company could not refuse to carry out to completion the construction of Dubuffet's site-
specific sculpture since DuBuffet had a moral right in that structure. Pollaud-Dulian,
supra note 2, at 166-68.
229. See supra notes at 87-95 and accompanying text (examining the French judi-
cial protection of artists' rights). Consider the case of a work of art that has been
incorporated into a larger architectural work. Under United States law, courts would
apply the particular standards for such a work, as set out in section 113 of Title 17.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 113 (setting forth the applicable moral rights standards). Under
French law, courts would apply general moral rights doctrine, as it has been inter-
preted in case law. See supra note 60 (discussing Dubuffet). French courts might bal-
ance the needs of the builder and society (i.e., the importance of urban development,
the owner's "technical reasons" for wanting to alter the property, and other utilitarian
needs of the professional and commercial community) against the moral rights of the
artists whose work has been threatened. INT'L COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, at 101-102;
Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 210, 212. While both systems may achieve similar
results in this instance, only the French system insures that all works will be covered,
and that the law will evolve to suit the particular circumstances at issue. However,
some exceptions to the rule of general coverage under French law do exist. This flexi-
bility was insufficient to encompass audiovisual works. Instead, the 1957 Law had to be
amended. See supra note 24 (explaining that 1985 amendments to the 1957 Law ad-
dress the specific problems raised by audiovisual and computer works).
230. See supra note 229 (discussing the benefits of a more generalized moral rights
statute).
231. 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 1.
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of art.232 The VARA, however, unlike French law, 233 makes a distinc-
tion between copy and image; the VARA provides that moral rights
shall not extend coverage to authors when the work at issue is a repro-
duction, depiction or portrayal of the original visual work of art.2" In
many ways, this distinction seems antithetical to the aims of the
VARA. 235 An artist might paint a portrait of a nude, only to have a
magazine publisher impose airblown clothing onto the copy it intends
to print. Under French law, either the paternity right or the integrity
right could protect an author against such an indignity. 230 Under
United States law, the VARA would deny such protection.2 37 Even if
the author could prove that such alterations would cause prejudice to
her honor or reputation, the VARA states that paternity and integrity
rights shall not apply to reproductions, depictions or portrayals made in
connection with conventional forms of image distribution, such as
magazines, periodicals, and audiovisual depictions.238
Arguably, the VARA's limitation in regard to reproductions serves
important practical goals.2 39 The VARA's restriction encourages crea-
tivity. It permits artists to build upon the works and ideas of their peers
or predecessors by limiting moral rights protection to original works
and limited editions of 200 copies or fewer (i.e., it would permit an
artist to form a collage out of copies of existing works of art).240 It also
extends moral rights protection to those reproductions which qualify, in
and of themselves, as visual works of art (i.e., it would, most likely,
permit a sculptor to realize his or her vision of a particular painting, if
232. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A.
233. 1957 Law, supra note 24, tit. 1.
234. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 481.
235. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 481; see also Damich, supra note 13, at 976-77
(proposing that the law should "protect the fidelity of reproductions of paintings, draw-
ings and sculptures not produced in multiples no matter what the medium of
reproduction").
236. See supra notes 72-97 and accompanying text (discussing the degree to which
the droit moral protects the rights of artists against distortion of their work).
237. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(3). The VARA thus perpetuates the pre-VARA state
of the law on this issue. See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n., 745 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that the lobbying group which reproduced plaintiff's paint-
ing, enlarging and cropping it, was not liable under the New York Artists' Authorship
Rights Act).
238. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(3); see also infra note 240 (discussing the implica-
tions of the VARA's reproduction exception).
239. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 481-84 (asserting that moral rights protection
does not need to extend beyond the first 200 copies of a work; "[t]hese 200 copies
supply the core of the artist's creation, and may afford sufficient representations for the
public to consult in order to perceive the work as the artist intended it to be seen").
240. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 481-83.
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the sculpture itself met the requirements of the statutory definition of
work of visual art).24'
While the reproduction limitation furthers legitimate ends, the
VARA could have achieved those same ends without imposing the dis-
tinction between copy and image, and without automatically precluding
authors from making a case.242 The French experience has shown that
the language which delineates the moral right is enough, in and of it-
self, to prevent the stifling of ideas. 43 While the language and interpre-
tation of the French law may lead to some uncertainties as to which
works will and will not be protected, it provides authors with an oppor-
tunity to show that their rights have been violated. It allows courts to
decide whether an author's right to respect has been infringed. 4
4
241. Cf 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(3) (implying that the limitations on reproduction
rights shall not apply to items not defined as "works of visual art").
242. See Damich, supra note 13 at 981-82 (stating that the VARA should recog-
nize more reproduction rights). Consider the case of an artist who adds a moustache
and goatee to a copy of Leonardo DaVinci's Mona Lisa (as Duchamp did to create the
now famous "L.H.O.O.Q.") and subsequently prints her adaptation in a magazine,
newspaper, poster, or similar publication. Under the VARA, the gesture would be per-
mitted without question. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(3) (stating that rights in the
VARA shall not apply to: any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work
in, upon, or in connection with any item described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of the
definition of "work of visual art"). Id. Section (A) of § 101 states that the definition of
"work of visual art" does not include any:
poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion
picture, or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical .... or
similar publication.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101(A). Under French law, the gesture would, most likely, be similarly
tolerated - but only after the artist convinced a court that he or she had not harmed
DaVinci's reputation by altering a copy of the work. See 1957 Law, supra note 24, art.
6; supra notes 71-96 and accompanying text (setting forth the French law and judicial
interpretation of paternity and integrity rights). While similar results may be reached
under both United States and French Law, United States Law forecloses any chance
artists may have to prove that their rights have been violated.
The exceptions as set forth in § 106(A)(c)(3) of the VARA, do not entirely foreclose
protection of all reproductions of artworks. But, by precluding the extension of integ-
rity and paternity rights to items such as posters and applied art, the Act undoubtedly
limits its scope of protection. This is especially likely given the ambiguity of the terms,
"poster" and "applied art." Undefined by statute, these terms could encompass practi-
cally any work. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(A)(c)(3).
243. See supra note 229 (discussing the advantage of the more general French
moral rights statute). In France, there is no statutory reproduction exception; courts
simply construe the general law. See 1957 Law, supra note 24, tit. I (providing that
moral rights protect the author of the work, rather than the work itself; this protection
extends to all forms of the work, be it the original or the copy). French courts achieve a
balance between promotion of ideas and artistic protection by applying different bur-
dens of proof to different scenarios. See infra note 259 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing, for example, French common law approach to judging artistic adaptations of
works).
244. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text (comparing the structure of
the 1957 Law and VARA and the advantages afforded by the French statute).
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B. RIGHTS
The VARA provides authors with only two of the four basic moral
rights recognized under French law, the right to integrity and the right
to attribution .1 5 Presumably, legislators excluded the right to withdraw
from the VARA since it serves little or no practical purpose in the
countries that recognize it.2"' While in theory, the right to withdraw
complements the other components of the moral rights doctrine,4 the
French experience has shown that in practice, the right is too costly
and inefficient for authors to exercise.24 8
Some commentators argue that United States artists do not need the
VARA to provide them with the right to divulge or to determine if and
when their works are complete and ready to display to the public be-
cause the United States Copyright law recognizes an equivalent
right.249 This right, commonly known as the right of first publication,
provides copyright owners with the sole authority to perform, distribute
or publish their works.250
While the right to control publication subsumes much of the right to
divulge, including the right to display, perform or publish, it does leave
some gaps. For instance, it confers the right upon the copyright
owner,25' rather than the artist.252 Thus, a question remains as to
whether a court could compel artists to show their work to the public,
where they are not satisfied with their product, but have transferred
245. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a).
246. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (criticizing the value of the
right to withdraw).
247. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 126-28, 178-90 (explaining the founda-
tions of moral rights, and discussing the general application of the right to withdraw).
248. Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 126-28, 178-90. In addition, a right to with-
draw is not needed in the VARA since the right applies to literary works which are
excluded by the VARA. Id.
249. Leafier, supra note 68, at 240 & n.87 (stating that the right to divulge is
recognized under American law); Cline, supra note 125, at 437 (referring to copyright
law as recognizing the right of first publication).
250. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). The Copyright Act provides that the owner of the
copyright
"has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work...;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works. . . to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works... and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a mo-
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their rights in that work to a purchaser who wishes to display the
work. 53 Additionally, the right of first publication (unlike the French
right of divulgation),2 54 limits the display right to public display. 55
This restriction would most likely prevent authors from protesting
against the private display of their work, even if they disapprove." 6
C. FEATURES
Both the 1957 Law and the VARA prohibit authors from assigning
their moral rights; however, only the VARA allows authors to waive
their moral rights.25 This difference may be attributed to the philoso-
phies from which the rights stem.25 The VARA's waiver provision de-
rives from the American notion of freedom to contract. 50 The 1957
Law's provision derives from the French notion of natural law which
bars one from contracting away a personality right. 60
At first blush, the difference in treatment of waiver appears extreme.
However, French case law reveals a judicial tolerance towards waiver,
despite the 1957 Law's provision to the contrary. 61 Both French and
252. See supra note 249 (setting forth the text of the right of first publication).
Under the 1957 Law, the "author" has the right to disclose. 1957 Law, supra note 24,
art. 1.
253. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (setting forth the Whistler
case). The outcome of this situation is clear under French law: the owner of the eco-
nomic right could not compel divulgation.
254. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing the divulgation
right as interpreted in the Buffet case).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1989).
256. Id. The author alone has the right to divulge her work under French law. The
law does not differentiate between public and private disclosure. 1957 Law, supra note
24, art. 19.
257. Compare 1957 Law, supra note 24, art. 6 (prohibiting waiver, but permitting
transfer) and 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e) (delineating transfer and waiver rights). Al-
though the VARA has built some safeguards into the law, i.e., by requiring that the
artists expressly agree to waive rights in specific pieces of work, for specific uses, the
possibility still exists that waiver provisions "will become boilerplate language in all
standard contracts." Marik, supra note 30, at 9.
258. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (comparing the origins and
philosophies of the droit moral and the VARA).
259. Damich, supra note 13, at 967 (explaining that the waiver provision for moral
rights developed from the freedom to contract).
260. Damich, supra note 13, at 967-68, 990 (stating that moral rights are not
transferable under the 1957 Law).
261. See Treece, supra note 118, at 505-06 (stating that as a matter of practice,
French courts often enforce waiver clauses). "[T]he notion that the moral right is ina-
lienable is riddled with exceptions: the courts consistently permit reasonable changes
without the author's consent in collective works and in adaptations - where changes
are necessary." Id.; see also DaSilva, supra note 4, at 16 (citing Pierre Recht who
states that the courts, in enforcing such provisions, are acting properly; "for any other
decision would render meaningless the force of contracts"); id. at 35 & n.236 (quoting
the Tribunal de Bordeaux, which states "when transferring the right to adopt his work.
[VOL. 8:183
ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT
American laws would, in effect, nullify explicit waiver of all moral
rights (i.e., "for this project, I hereby waive all of my rights to this
creation").262 Similarly, both laws would, most likely, validate the im-
plicit waiver of certain moral rights (i.e., "for this project, I permit you
to realize costumes from my costume designs"). 0 3
While the VARA's waiver provision might not be as ominous as
many fear (because of its safeguards), 6 critics suggest that the end
result will be the development of a wide range of different types of
waivers that would not be tolerated under French law.2 3 For example,
if an artist permits a third party to use his or her artwork as scenery in
a play, but then objects to the political context of the production,
French law might find that the artist's moral rights had been violated,
whereas United States law might find otherwise.26 The VARA pro-
vides for a study of the effects of the provision in order to address the
controversy and provide guidance for future possible reform. 07
In France, the moral right is perpetual. 68 Under the VARA, how-
ever, moral rights endure only for the life of the author.28 Although
United States limitations regarding duration of the right pose philo-
sophical questions,70 they serve a practical purpose. A term of "life of
the author" grants author rights, without unduly prohibiting or re-
the author implicitly consents to all modifications which are necessitated by the techni-
cal conditions and applicable rules of an art which is essentially different from that of
the preexisting work").
262. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing features of French and
American waiver).
263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing features of French and
American waiver).
264. See Buskirk, supra note 147, at 39 (conceding that "[i]n the final act, the
waiver provisions are very narrowly drafted").
265. Marik, supra note 30, at 9 (suggesting that in attempting to display their
work, artists will renounce many valuable rights). Richard Serra expressed the fear of
many when he stated that the waiver is "hypocritical in that it negates the moral rights
of artists and places them in the hands of the client, and no doubt it will be used by
both patrons and institutions to deny artists moral rights." Buskirk, supra note 147, at
39.
266. See supra note 119 (comparing the two verdicts of Shostakovich under Amer-
ican and French law).
267. 17 U.S.C.A. § 608(a).
268. 1957 Law, supra note 24, arts. 6, 19, 20. See DaSilva, supra note 4, at 14
(observing that while the right is perpetual, the "[artists'] heirs inherit only the right to
exercise the right, not the right itself").
269. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d).
270. See Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 132 (explaining that the perpetual nature
of the moral right is inherent in its origins); Damich, supra note 13, at 993 (agreeing
that "perpetual protection logically follows from moral rights theory because the work
is not any less an expression of the author's personality as time passes").
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straining future derivative works.27' The limited duration may also pre-
vent heirs with little experience or training in art from making deci-
sions which violate the wishes of the deceased.2"2 While a life of the
author provision has benefits, it has one marked drawback. That is, it
does not further the benefit of arts preservation. 73 Under the VARA,
once an artist dies, an artist's moral rights dissolve; thus, the rightful
owners of that artist's work may treat her work in any way they so
choose. 74
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As moral rights gain acceptance in the United States, the VARA
should evolve in accordance with the lessons of the French experience.
Subject matter should expand to include not only visual works of fine
art, but all visual arts and other forms of authorship, including literary
and musical works (but excluding audiovisual and computer works).2 75
The VARA should eliminate hypertechnical and arbitrary distinctions
(language restricting protection to those works existing in "limited edi-
tions of 200 copies or fewer" and "signed by the author") 7 6 among
works of visual art. Furthermore, the Act should expand coverage to
include those intellectual works of the mind that fit comfortably within
the moral rights schemework (i.e., books and crafts, but not films and
computer programs).277
271. See Beyer, supra note 99, at 1079 (advocating that author's rights to prohibit
derivative works should not extend beyond the life of the author; "[tihis would permit
innovative use of existing creations").
272. Buskirk, supra note 147, at 39 n.13; Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 218,
236. In France, successors do not have authority to make decisions based on their opin-
ions or taste, since they are the instruments of the author and thus owe her fidelity. Id.
But, heirs do not always act in the interest of the deceased author. DaSilva, supra note
4, at 15; see also id. (stating that the perpetual nature of the moral right has been
questioned; "nowhere else in French law does a personal right exist in perpetuity").
273. Damich, supra note 13, at 993. In France, perpetual moral rights protection
benefits society from the alteration or modification of artworks in the public domain.
Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 2, at 232.
274. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d) (stating that protection afforded to artists under
the VARA expires at the death of the author).
275. See Damich, supra note 13, at 975 (suggesting that moral rights should ex-
tend to "all works that evidence artistic creativity"); see also supra notes 197-202 and
accompanying text (criticizing the limited subject matter of protection under the
VARA).
276. See Damich supra note 13, at 976 (questioning the usefulness of the limited
edition concept).
277. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text (stating that theoretically




The provisions excluding reproductions and copies from coverage
should be omitted. Although such an exclusion does afford some practi-
cal benefits (mainly the promotion of derivative works), common law
interpretation of the general moral right attains those same benefits
while affording greater flexibility in the law.2"8 A general scheme of
protection (with no specific reproduction exclusion) should function in
much the same way as the French system of implied waiver; that is to
generally allow authorized adaptations, thus encouraging creativity,
while reserving the right to forbid those which truly harm the authors'
reputation, or the integrity of their works.2" 9
Categories of protection should be eliminated from the VARA in or-
der to afford more general, but uniform application of the law. The
VARA should extend moral rights protection to all works of visual art,
regardless of whether the work has been incorporated into a building,
and regardless of whether the work can be removed from the building
without damaging the creation's integrity. Such application not only
prevents gaps in coverage, and thus would extend moral rights protec-
tion to site-specific works, but better comports with the philosophical
underpinnings of the moral rights doctrine.2 0
Standards of worth, such as "of recognized stature" and "prejudice
to honor or reputation," should be excluded in order to prevent discrim-
inatory treatment of artists, to create consistency within the VARA, as
well as to eliminate the need to judge aesthetics.280 Rather, all works
should be subject to a single, non-qualitative standard (i.e., the right to
respect for an artist's name and the integrity of his or her work) to
provide uniformity within the VARA, and encourage non-prejudicial
treatment of artists.
Rights should be extended to include a divulgation right in order to
protect those rights not covered by the more traditional copyright doc-
trine of "right of first publication." The divulgation right should explic-
itly confer all rights encompassed by the VARA upon the author (as
278. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text (comparing the VARA's re-
production exception with the French Law, which has no such exception).
279. See supra note 261 (describing the French common law understanding of im-
plied waiver).
280. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
raised by categorization of works).
281. See Damich, supra note 13, at 979 (advocating that moral rights legislation
should dispose of standards based upon artistic merit); supra notes 167-78 and accom-
panying text (elaborating upon the problems which such standards create).
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opposed to the copyright owner), and it should cover the right to both
public and private display.2"2
Duration of coverage should be extended to life of author plus fifty in
order to facilitate the balance between protection of works and promo-
tion of ideas, as well as to create consistent copyright treatment. This
compromise provides artists with protection for a significant period be-
yond their own death (and provides society with a limited form of arts
preservation), without forever fettering the rights of other artists who
wish to build upon their work, and without unduly burdening heirs with
a responsibility they might not be capable of executing.
2 3
The VARA's waiver provision, which affords authors with the lim-
ited but potentially dangerous ability to renounce their moral rights in
their own creation," 4 should be excluded from the VARA, regardless
of the findings of the Copyright Office study. Notions of implied waiver
would suffice to permit adaptations of works, while at the same time
affording better protection to the rights of artists.28 5
CONCLUSION
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 represents a significant vic-
tory for United States citizens. For the first time in United States his-
tory, the VARA creates a doctrine that protects non-economic, non-
tangible interest in property, by virtue of the fact that the property is
special. When compared to the French droit moral, however, the
VARA falls short of its potential. Its chief obstacle lies not in its eco-
nomic-based, positive law origins, but in its own methodology. In its
effort to draw fine distinctions between whom and what should be pro-
tected, the VARA creates varied and unnecessary standards, excep-
tions, and categories which limit the VARA's application. Thus, the
VARA cannot attain the same complete, consistent, and flexible cover-
age enjoyed by the more general French moral rights doctrine. As the
moral rights theory gains acceptance in the United States, the VARA
should yield to the French experience. United States legislators should
282. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text (describing the right of first
publication; and discussing the gaps in coverage that exist between that right and its
analog, the right to divulge).
283. See supra notes 257-74 and accompanying text (comparing the pros and cons
of finite and infinite moral rights coverage, as codified in the VARA and the 1957 Law,
respectively).
284. See supra note 188-89 (explaining how the waiver provision may work to de-
feat the intentions of the VARA).
285. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (examining some benefits of the
French system of common law implied waiver).
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strive to amend the law in accordance with the joint lessons of its own
copyright history and French moral rights traditions.
